Advice-taking as a bridge between decision neuroscience and mental capacity by van der Plas, Elisa et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1016/j.ijlp.2019.101504
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
van der Plas, E., David, A. S., & Fleming, S. M. (2019). Advice-taking as a bridge between decision
neuroscience and mental capacity. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 67, [101504].
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2019.101504
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 29. Jul. 2020
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijlawpsy
Advice-taking as a bridge between decision neuroscience and mental
capacity
Elisa van der Plasa,⁎, Anthony S. Davidb, Stephen M. Fleminga,c,⁎
aWellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London WC1N 3BG, UK
b Institute of Mental Health, University College London, London W1T 7NF, UK
cMax Planck University College London, Centre for Computational Psychiatry and Ageing Research, London WC1B 5EH, UK
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Capacity
Decision-making capacity
Advice-taking
Decision neuroscience
A B S T R A C T
A person's capacity to process advice is an important aspect of decision making in the real world. For example, in
decisions about treatment, the way patients respond to the advice of family, friends and medical professionals
may be used (intentionally or otherwise) as a marker of the “use or weigh” requirement of decision-making
capacity. Here we explore neuroscientific research on decision-making to identify features of advice-taking that
help conceptualize this requirement. We focus on studies of the neural and computational basis of decision-
making in laboratory settings. These studies originally investigated simple perceptual decisions about ambiguous
stimuli, but have more recently been extended to more complex “value-based” decisions involving the com-
parison of subjective preferences. Value-based decisions are a useful model system for capacity-related decision-
making as they do not have an objectively ‘correct’ answer and are instead based on subjective preferences. In
this context, advice-taking can be seen as a process in which new evidence for one or other option is integrated,
leading to altered behaviour or choices. We use this framework to distinguish between different types of advice-
taking: private compliance consists of updating one's privately held beliefs based on new evidence, whereas in
the case of public compliance, people change their behaviour at a surface level without shifting their privately-
held beliefs. Importantly, both types of advice-taking may lead to similar outcomes but rely on different decision
processes. We suggest that understanding how multiple mechanisms drive advice-taking holds promise for
targeting decision-making support and improving our understanding of the use and weigh requirement in cases
of contested capacity.
1. Introduction
The young patient “Z” has been considered by her clinicians not to
have full insight into her risky online behaviour and social interactions.
The court questions whether Z’s abnormal susceptibility to others is an
indication of her inability to ‘use and weigh’:
“…as a consequence of Z's autism, which impacts on her ability to put
herself in other people's shoes and make judgments with regard to their
intentions towards her, she struggles to think through the consequences of
having contact with another individual who may pose a risk to her […].
As a consequence of this inability to weigh up the positives […] Z lacks
capacity to make decisions regarding contact with others.” (Cobb
[2016] EWCOP 4)
The legal notion of mental capacity refers to an individual's ability
to make autonomous decisions about their own welfare, often referred
to as decision-making capacity (DMC). In the UK, the concept of capacity
in relation to various types of decisions was initially developed via the
common law, before being incorporated into a statutory framework in
the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act (2000) and the Mental Capacity
Act (MCA; 2005) in England and Wales. These instruments are intended
to cover the circumstances in which necessary acts of caring can be
administered (and decisions about these acts taken) on behalf of in-
dividuals lacking capacity to either consent to care or make their own
decisions.
According to the MCA, the criteria for assessing mental capacity are
twofold – diagnostic and functional. The diagnostic criteria state that a
person's lack of capacity must be due to an “impairment of, or a dis-
turbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain” (s. 2(1)). The functional
criterion is a test for the capacity to make decisions, and states (s. 3(1))
that an individual is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable –
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlp.2019.101504
Received 12 June 2019; Received in revised form 9 September 2019; Accepted 10 September 2019
⁎ Corresponding authors.
E-mail addresses: elisa.plas.18@ucl.ac.uk (E. van der Plas), stephen.fleming@ucl.ac.uk (S.M. Fleming).
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 67 (2019) 101504
Available online 26 November 2019
0160-2527/ © 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
T
a) to understand the information relevant to the decision,
b) to retain that information,
c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the
decision, or
d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign lan-
guage or any other means).
While a majority of capacity cases are uncontroversial (e.g. Ruck
Keene, Kane, Kim & Owen, 2019, estimate that 95% of applications to
the Court of Protection fall into the category of uncontentious appli-
cations determined without a hearing), in those that are contested, the
most contentious point is the “using or weighing” of information which
does not always have obvious outward signs (Case, 2016; Ruck Keene
et al., 2019). The MCA 2005 is also clear that the application of idio-
syncratic values should not bias the assessment of use or weigh, stating
that P “is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he
makes an unwise decision” (s.1(4)). In other words, the law aspires to be
value-liberal – supporting the right of patients to act for “any reason,
rational or irrational, or for no reason at all” (Re MB [1997]; Re T [1992]
ER 649). As an example, we can consider the recent case of “C”, who
refused treatment for dialysis despite good prognosis because she be-
lieved it would compromise her freewheeling lifestyle. In a statement to
the court, her daughter wrote: “Although they are not reasons that are
easy to understand, I believe that they are not only fully thought through, but
also entirely in keeping with both her (unusual) value system and her
(unusual) personality” (Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C
and V [2015] EWCOP 80).
The use or weigh requirement refers to the process of making a
decision, rather than the outcome of a decision. Evaluating how such a
decision process unfolds is typically contingent on new information
being provided to P in the form of information or advice – either for-
mally (in the case of interactions with health professionals) or in-
formally (from friends and family). For instance, in the case extract
with which we began this article, we see that the court's impression of
Z's decision-making capacity is informed by her excessive susceptibility
to the influence of others, suggesting that she did not truly use or weigh
information herself.
In this article we focus on the role that decision neuroscience might
play in informing our understanding of the advice-taking process, and
thereby how we conceptualize the use or weigh requirement. Because
the process of advice-taking can be simulated in a laboratory setting, it
forms a natural bridge between the literatures on decision neuroscience
(e.g. Campbell-Meiklejohn, Bach, Roepstorff, Dolan, & Frith, 2010;
Campbell-Meiklejohn, Simonsen, Frith, & Daw, 2017; De Martino,
Bobadilla-Suarez, Nouguchi, Sharot, & Love, 2017; Izuma & Adolphs,
2013) and mental capacity (Gomez-Beldarrain, Harries, Garcia-Monco,
Ballus, & Grafman, 2004; Kennedy, Dornan, Rutledge, O'Neill, &
Kennedy, 2009). Another advantage of bridging between work on DMC
and advice-taking is that decision neuroscience offers the promise of a
deeper and more nuanced understanding of why certain decision pro-
cesses may be impaired due to “an impairment of the mind or brain”.
The outline of this article is as follows. First, we start with briefly
reviewing the general information-processing view of the mind in
cognitive science that grounds a majority of work in decision neu-
roscience. Second, we review studies of the cognitive and neural basis
of simple decisions, before exploring how these frameworks can be
extended to accommodate advice-taking and so-called post-decisional
processing. We then consider different types of advice-taking behaviour
(such as how public compliance may differ from private belief change)
and outline the contribution of metacognition (or insight) and menta-
lising in advice-taking. Finally, we explore how these lines of work in
the neurosciences may inform an understanding of the psychological
basis of the use or weigh requirement.
Before we begin, we should point out that the information-processing
view of most current neuroscientific studies of decision-making is
simplistic compared to the often complex, emotionally-charged
decisions about which capacity is typically questioned. Further, it is not
known how the core principles of decision-making elucidated in the lab
generalise to these situations. For example, decisions that usually give
rise to capacity assessments do not have an objectively ‘correct’ answer
(e.g. treatment decisions, financial decisions, sexual consent), an issue
we will return to towards the end of the article. On balance, however,
we believe that there are benefits from adopting a decision neu-
roscience perspective, not least in providing a value-liberal framework
with which to begin to quantify the process, rather than the content, of
a decision – i.e. the internal workings of the mind of an individual who
is making the decision and not what preferences or values constitute
this process.
An example of value-based practise in health care is that of a patient
who decides not to engage in treatment because the treatment reduces
the patient's ability to engage in activity X (e.g. work as a primary
school teacher). Good medical practise is to judge this patient's DMC in
a way that is unbiased by the patient's personal preferences, e.g. the
content of X (Petrova, Dale, & Bill, 2006); even better medical practise
would be to judge the patient's DMC based on the process through
which the preference for X was generated, in a way that is impartial to
the content of X. Our framework does not say what people should
choose, but suggests means of support to encourage people to use and
weigh new information in light of their current beliefs, with a me-
chanistic model of decision-making as a guide.
2. Cognitive and computational approaches to decision-making
The dominant model in the cognitive science of decision-making is
that a decider receives some kind of input (from the senses or from
memory) and then processes these inputs to arrive at a discrete choice.
An agent is thought to reduce uncertainty about which decision to make
by sampling information about the potential benefits and disadvantages
of the various available options (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). The goal of
decision neuroscience is to work out what kind of internal processes
govern this transformation of input into output.
Research in this field has focused on two different types of decision.
First, research on “perceptual decision-making” (PDM) builds on clas-
sical psychophysics from the late 19th century (e.g. Peirce & Jastrow,
1884), and aims to understand how subjects discriminate different
types of sensory information (such as deciding whether an object is an
apple or an orange from only a brief glimpse; see Hanks & Summerfield,
2017, for a recent review). In contrast, research on “value-based deci-
sion-making” (VDM) grew out of the field of behavioural economics,
and studies the processes involved in choices involving a comparison of
subjective preferences (such as deciding whether to eat an apple or an
orange; see Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). In both cases, the
decision process is often studied under conditions of uncertainty, such
as when sensory information is noisy or ambiguous, or when value-
based choices are made about stimuli that deliver a variable and
changing level of reward.
A key benefit of studying PDM is that an explicitly ‘correct’ answer
exists, allowing a precise quantification of the speed and accuracy of
individual choices. An influential task in studies of PDM is the random-
dot motion task (Fig. 1a). Random-dot motion stimuli consist of a ra-
pidly moving cloud of dots presented briefly on a computer screen
(typically for less than a second), and a given proportion of the dots are
arranged to move coherently in a particular direction (e.g. left or right;
Britten, Shadlen, Newsome, & Movshon, 1992; Kim & Shadlen, 1999).
On each ‘trial’ of the task subjects are asked to decide whether the dot
cloud is mostly moving in one or other direction. It is striking that
behaviour in these kinds of tasks can be precisely accommodated by
computational models that assume the brain receives noisy samples of
evidence about the world (e.g. whether the dots are moving left or
right), and compares these samples to an internal decision threshold
(Fig. 1c; Vickers, 1979; Luce, 1992; Ratcliff, 1978). When these samples
are aggregated over time, these models can predict how long the
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observer takes to make a decision (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; Wald, 1947)
and how confident they are in their choice (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009).
Similar evidence accumulation models have been successfully ap-
plied to model both decision time and choice in VDM (Basten, Biele,
Heekeren, & Fiebach, 2010; Hutcherson, Bushong, & Rangel, 2015;
Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Krajbich, Hare, Bartling, Morishima,
& Fehr, 2015). A classic example is the food choice task, on which
hungry subjects are presented with images of food items that can be
selected for consumption at the end of the experiment (Fig. 1b). How
much time it takes for someone to decide is an indication of the sub-
jective difficulty of the decision (which is usually higher when the two
options are more similar in value; Krajbich et al., 2010; Fig. 1c). These
findings imply that subjects also have internal uncertainty about their
own preferences – for instance how confident they are in preferring
apples over oranges (De Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013;
Manski, 1977). We will return to this important point later in the ar-
ticle.
In the context of value-based decision-making, decision neu-
roscience has also emphasised a distinction between whether in-
dividuals tend to act habitually; recalling the value that has often been
attached to a previous action in the past, or in a way that foresees the
future consequences of sequences of actions (sometimes known as
model-based planning; Valentin, Dickinson, & Doherty, 2007). While
this distinction is beyond the scope of the current article, it is plausible
that the depth of planning may intersect with advice-taking in inter-
esting ways (e.g. an individual who is myopic in their planning may be
over-responsive to advice).
3. Decision-making in the brain
Following the creation of simple paradigms for studying decision-
making in the lab, there has been increasing interest in the neural basis
of these types of decisions (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). We refer the reader
to comprehensive reviews on the neural basis of PDM and VDM
(Glimcher & Fehr, 2013; Hanks & Summerfield, 2017), and here focus
on a few core principles that have emerged from this work. To a rough
approximation, different subregions of the cortex are engaged in dif-
ferent, specialized computations. For instance, the visual cortex, in the
posterior temporal and occipital lobes, is specifically involved in pro-
cessing inputs from the eyes to support visual perception. A series of
studies in animals and humans over the past two decades has begun to
bridge the gap between perception and action to understand how
simple choices are made. In studies of PDM, for instance, neural po-
pulations in the association cortex – the parietal and frontal lobes –
have been found to gradually increase their firing rate up to a point at
which a decision is made (Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini, &
Ungerleider, 2004; O'Connell, Dockree, & Kelly, 2012; Roitman &
Shadlen, 2002). The idea is that these activity patterns receive input
from areas processing sensory input (for instance area V5 of the visual
cortex in the case of the random dot motion task), and represent a
neural instantiation of the evidence accumulation process inherent to
the computational frameworks introduced above.
Intriguingly, the same circuits are also involved when people make
more subjective choices in VDM paradigms (e.g. Platt & Glimcher,
1999). Rather than integrating sensory information such as direction of
motion, subjective values (such as how much I prefer apples over or-
anges) are thought to feed into these choice circuits until a decision is
made. It is thought that the medial prefrontal cortex, in conjunction
with regions important for memory such as the hippocampus (Barron,
Dolan, & Behrens, 2013), retrieves information about past experience to
construct these subjective values (Chib, Rangel, Shimojo, & Doherty,
2009; Glimcher, 2011; Rangel et al., 2008). On these tasks, there is no
objectively ‘correct’ answer, but difficulty can be manipulated by
changing the difference in subjective value between the two choice
options. In the next section we turn to how these studies of information
processing in the service of simple decisions help shed light on the use
or weigh process during advice-taking.
4. Post-decisional evidence processing as a model of advice-taking
A majority of work in decision neuroscience has focused on char-
acterising the processes leading up to a value-based or perceptual
choice, but less attention has been paid to how people integrate new
information after a choice has been made, or how this post-decisional
processing may lead to a change of mind. Initial work in this area
characterised how evidence accumulation may continue for a short
time after the choice, supporting endogenous error monitoring
(Murphy, Robertson, Harty, & O'Connell, 2015; Rabbitt, 1966) and
changes of mind (Resulaj, Kiani, Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2009; van den
Berg et al., 2016). More recently this line of work has been extended to
ask how exogenous evidence presented after an initial choice may lead to
later changes of mind.
In these tasks, subjects first make a judgment based on some evi-
dence (e.g. an estimation of the direction of a random-dot motion dis-
play), after which they are presented with new evidence (e.g. additional
motion) and are asked to make a final judgment. The general finding is
that people tend to update their final judgment after seeing the new
evidence and that this updating is stronger when the new evidence is
more reliable or stronger (Bronfman et al., 2015; Fleming, van der
Putten, & Daw, 2018), or when the new evidence confirms the initial
judgment (known as ‘confirmation bias’; Talluri, Urai, Tsetsos, Usher, &
Donner, 2018).
For example, Fleming et al. (2018) asked subjects to make a first
judgment about whether a random-dot motion display with variable
evidence strength was mostly moving to the left or right. After this
decision, people were shown an additional display of motion in the
same direction as the first display (post-decision evidence) which the
subjects could use to update their confidence about whether their initial
Fig. 1. A schematic example of an evidence accumulation framework for per-
ceptual decision-making (PDM) and value-based decision-making (VDM). (a). A
decision about whether a patch of dots is moving to the left or right (PDM), or
(b) whether to eat an apple or an orange (VDM), are both studied under cases of
uncertainty e.g. when sensory information is noisy or ambiguous or when the
value of each object is not perfectly known. (c). Computational models of the
decision process assume that the brain receives noisy samples of evidence about
the world and compares the accumulated evidence to an internal threshold for
each available option (the threshold for when accumulated value results in a
selection of an apple or an orange, for instance). When these samples are ag-
gregated over time, such models can predict both choice and how long the
observer takes to make a decision (response time).
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decision was correct. The authors also scanned the brains of partici-
pants while they received the new evidence using functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI), which tracks fluctuations in blood flow (a
proxy of neuronal activity) in different regions of the brain. This al-
lowed the identification of regions in which activity fluctuations
tracked whether or not people changed their minds. The posterior
medial frontal cortex (pMFC), a region that activates when people de-
tect that they have made a mistake and adjust their behaviour ac-
cordingly (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Ridderinkhof, van den
Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004), tracked the strength of post-
decision evidence and signalled the need for behavioural adaptation. In
contrast, activity in the anterior prefrontal cortex (aPFC), a region in-
volved in metacognition (the ability to know whether we are right or
wrong, see below) mediated the impact of new evidence on people's
subjective confidence.
Together, these studies have contributed to an emerging under-
standing of how new evidence is processed to flexibly change an initial
judgment when needed. Interestingly, these studies have also shown
that the way in which new evidence is integrated is similar across dis-
tinct tasks (e.g. perceptual and numerical tasks; Bronfman et al., 2015;
Talluri et al., 2018). Ongoing research is now building upon this finding
by examining how new evidence is integrated from both non-social and
social information sources, and whether non-social and social post-de-
cision evidence provide similar information content (Olsen, Roepstorff
& Bang, 2018; Pescetelli & Yeung, 2018). These paradigms ask subjects
to make a first (perceptual or value-based) decision and then present
the opinion of an ‘adviser’ (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth,
2008; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2017; De Martino et al., 2017; Gomez-Beldarrain et al., 2004; Sniezek &
Van Swol, 2001). Interestingly, and in line with the finding that more
reliable evidence elicits more changes of mind (Bronfman et al., 2015;
Fleming et al., 2018; Talluri et al., 2018), the reliability of the advice is
a crucial determinant of how much it engenders a change in subjects'
beliefs. In advice-taking settings, this advice reliability can be com-
municated in the form of the confidence of the adviser (Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2017; Gomez-
Beldarrain et al., 2004; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001), as judgments made
with higher confidence are typically more likely to be correct (Fig. 2).
In turn, the effects of the advice are strongest when the initial decision
is ambiguous or when an agent is uncertain about their initial judgment
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; De Martino et al., 2017). This information-
processing view of advice gives rise to useful predictions for when ad-
vice is most likely to have an impact on its recipient, in that new
(sensory or social) evidence would be expected to have a larger impact
on uncertain agents. Confidence is often distorted in psychiatric dis-
orders (e.g. more or less confidence than warranted by performance;
Rouault, Seow, Gillan, & Fleming, 2018; Stephan et al., 2016); this may
explain why some patients have been reported to be over- or under-
susceptible to advice, a topic to which we will return in the next section.
Together, these studies provide initial evidence that social advice is
processed similarly to post-decisional evidence in mediating changes of
mind.
5. The role of metacognition in advice-taking
In the previous section we outlined how changes of mind and im-
provements in performance are tightly coupled: being sensitive to new
evidence is especially beneficial when one's initial judgment is incorrect
in order to engender a change of mind. However, even if confidence and
accuracy are usually tightly linked, individuals vary in the ability to
monitor their performance, known as metacognition. Specifically, some
people are less able to notice differences in their performance, or be-
lieve themselves to be more or less accurate than they objectively are
(Rouault, Seow, et al., 2018). It has recently become possible to pre-
cisely quantify a person's ability to discriminate between their own
correct and incorrect judgments (known as “metacognitive sensitivity”)
using a variant of signal detection theory (Fleming & Lau, 2014). There
are various ways of calculating metacognitive sensitivity, with more
sophisticated methods being uncontaminated by differences in both
accuracy and metacognitive bias, a person's overall propensity to report
high confidence (Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010; Rouault,
Seow, et al., 2018).
Individual differences in metacognitive sensitivity have been found
to correlate with the structure and function of the aPFC, a brain area
involved in self-evaluation (Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000; Fleming,
Huijgen & Dolan, 2012; Hilgenstock, Weiss, & Witte, 2014; Shimamura
& Squire, 1986). This region together with the pMFC (discussed above
in the context of advice-taking) is reliably activated during the self-
evaluation of performance (Fleming & Dolan, 2012). It is notable that
areas such as pMFC and aPFC are implicated in both advice-taking and
the metacognitive evaluation of recent decisions, suggesting an im-
portant link between these two processes. The general link is un-
surprising given that knowing whether we are right or wrong (meta-
cognition) is one of the features that enable us to know when new
evidence (advice-taking) is beneficial. For example, if you are com-
pletely convinced about the best course of action, you may be less likely
to take someone's advice or consider another approach. On the other
hand, if you are unsure about your decision, you may be more likely to
look at what others are doing and follow their advice (Fig. 2 illustrates
the general relationship between confidence and advice-taking). In
sum, as advice-taking is most beneficial when one's first judgment was
wrong, it follows that metacognition is one of the features that
Fig. 2. People who are more certain about an initial
judgment are less likely to change their minds upon
being presented with new sensory evidence or social
advice. A decider receives a first sample of sensory
evidence on a random-dot motion task (first judg-
ment) and is then presented with either new sensory
evidence (a) or social advice (b). Based on this new
evidence, the decider makes a second judgment.
Confidence in the first judgment affects how likely
the decider is to take on board the new evidence
(integrating the new sensory evidence or following
the advice). More (versus less) confident decisions
are less (versus more) likely to be updated when new
sensory or social evidence becomes available.
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contributes to knowing when to take on board advice (Frith, 2012; Shea
et al., 2014).
In clinical settings, the term insight is used to encompass a patient's
awareness that they have a disorder, their ability to reflect on specific
beliefs including their response to hypothetical contradiction, and to
some extent follow the clinician's advice, for example regarding treat-
ment (Amador & David, 2004; David, 1990). There is also an associa-
tion between the concept of clinical insight and metacognition (David,
Bedford, Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012; Koren et al., 2005, 2004). Patients
deemed to have poor insight often show impaired decision-making
capacity (Owen et al., 2009). Furthermore, patients who lack mental
capacity are more likely to experience coercion (Cairns et al., 2005). To
the extent to which insight depends on metacognitive mechanisms, it
may be that poor insight leads to difficulty with the advice-taking
process (and vice-versa).
This link between metacognition and advice-taking is supported by
a recent study from Rollwage, Dolan, and Fleming (2018), who mea-
sured both metacognitive sensitivity and sensitivity to post-decision
evidence, and asked how these aspects were related to a personality
feature known as dogmatism (measured as the extent to which in-
dividuals were accepting of conflicting views on political issues). Me-
tacognitive sensitivity predicted the extent to which subjects integrated
new evidence on the perceptual task, supporting adaptive changes of
mind. In turn, both of these features of decision-making were atte-
nuated among those with higher levels of dogmatism. This finding
shows that metacognitive sensitivity may promote adaptive changes of
mind when new evidence becomes available. On top of that, this study
suggests similar processes may govern the processing of new evidence
in both low-level perceptual discrimination tasks and the broader, more
subjective decisions about topics such as politics.
6. The role of mentalising in advice-taking
When a decision is difficult to make, it can be advantageous to use
the full range of available evidence that is at one's disposal to reduce
choice uncertainty, including the advice of others. However, as briefly
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, from an information-pro-
cessing perspective, advice-taking should not only be dependent on the
decider's confidence but also on the reliability of the new evidence (De
Martino et al., 2017). In other words, efficient advice-taking involves
assessing not only the probability that oneself is correct (metacognition)
but also the probability that the adviser is correct (Burke, Tobler,
Baddeley, & Schultz, 2010; De Martino et al., 2017; Harvey & Fischer,
1997; Pescetelli & Yeung, 2019). Advisors' expressions of certainty are
typically a useful source of information about the advisers' reliability, as
people who say that they are confident are usually also more likely to
be correct (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn
et al., 2017; Gomez-Beldarrain et al., 2004; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001).
This process is complicated when the fidelity of the advisers' confidence
ratings is not representative of their accuracy (the adviser's metacog-
nitive sensitivity). Put differently, it is often sensible to take advisers'
certainty estimates with a pinch of salt (Bahrami et al., 2012, 2010;
Bang et al., 2017), and learn, over the course of repeated interactions,
which advisers' confidence estimates are more reliable than others
(Hertz et al., 2017; Pescetelli & Yeung, 2019). Pescetelli and Yeung
(2019) show that, over the course of repeated interactions with an
adviser, the extent to which ‘trust’ relationships are built/broken pre-
dict advice-taking. In psychiatric settings, this may be related to
trusting treatment providers to give the right advice.
The general set of processes involved in making inferences about
others' preferences and mental states is referred to as mentalising or
Theory of Mind (ToM; Frith & Frith, 2012, 2003). ToM and metacog-
nition may have a shared mechanism (Carruthers, 2009; Fleming &
Daw, 2017) that involves understanding that others' world views may
differ from our own and using this discrepancy to reason, for example,
how reliable others' advice may be (Behrens et al., 2008). This form of
ToM develops relatively late in human development (around five years;
Wimmer & Perner, 1983) probably through external feedback that
shows that others' worldviews can be different from one's own (Gopnik
& Wellman, 2010; Heyes & Frith, 2014). In cases of advice-taking about
treatment decisions (which are highly dependent on personal subjective
preferences) mentalising may play a crucial role in understanding why
someone decides one way or another. A well-established link between
psychiatric disorders and mentalising is supportive of this idea (Pousa
et al., 2008; but see, Frith & Happé, 1994), in addition to more recent
neuroimaging studies that explain clinical insight as a dysregulated
interplay between mentalising and metacognition (Holt et al., 2011;
Modinos, Renken, Ormel, & Aleman, 2011). For the patient, mentalising
may be involved in understanding that advice can be biased by the
dissimilar worldviews of others or the fidelity of the clinician's meta-
cognitive representations. For the clinician, mentalising may be in-
volved in understanding the patient's motives or idiosyncratic pre-
ferences. Thus, ToM reasoning in advice-taking is a two-way process – a
sound understanding of another person's views is important both for the
patient to assess the reliability of the clinician and for the clinician to
understand the decision-process of the patient (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. A schematic illustration of how mentalising
and metacognition may play a role in the advice-
taking and advice-giving process between a patient
and a clinician. Metacognition (indicated in orange)
may be used by the patient to understand whether
additional evidence is needed (how confident the
patient is that their own opinion is correct and that
their perceptions are ‘real’). For the clinician, meta-
cognition is involved in expressing the right level of
confidence in the advice (how confident the clinician
is that their advice is correct). Mentalising (indicated
in blue) plays a role in understanding why someone
is deciding one way or another, which may be re-
levant for a clinician to know whether a patient is
thinking through the consequences of different
courses of action and whether the advice needs to be
communicated differently to achieve a given level of
influence. For the patient, mentalising may be used
to understand the fidelity of the adviser's confidence
(the clinician's metacognition). (For interpretation of
the references to colour in this figure legend, the
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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7. Private versus public compliance
Up until this point we have considered how models of evidence
integration in simple decisions can be extended to characterise the
process of revising and updating a belief on the basis of new informa-
tion. These private changes in belief are thought to affect what the
subject truly feels or beliefs about the decision. In contrast, there are
plenty scenarios in which subjects publicly comply in order to fit in with
a social group (Bobek, Hageman, & Kelliher, 2011; Bond & Smith,
1996) or under the influence of an authority figure (Milgram, 1963),
but do not alter their privately held beliefs. As an example, consider a
clinician who advises a patient to take a particular medication and a
patient who complies with this advice. It may be that the patient blindly
follows the advice, or choses to do so tactically (e.g. to hasten their
discharge from hospital) irrespective of whether (s)he agrees that the
treatment is actually needed (Fig. 4b). Here, the outcome of the deci-
sion, i.e. following the advice, appears superficially similar to a case in
which a patient complies because (s)he appreciates the need for the
treatment – i.e. shows private as well as public compliance (Fig. 4a).
Despite an apparently similar decision outcome in both cases, the
consequences of advice-taking for behaviour may be radically different.
For example, in the case of public compliance (i.e. the patient outwardly
expresses their approval but is not genuinely convinced) a patient may
be less likely to follow the advice when the adviser is removed from the
situation (e.g. at home when medication needs to be taken). Yet in the
case of private compliance, the patient's agreement is more likely to
persist in time (Edelson, Sharot, Dolan, & Dudai, 2011; Izuma &
Adolphs, 2013).
A classic laboratory demonstration of supposedly public compliance
is the Asch study, in which subjects were asked to judge the length of
lines. When asked privately, subjects had an approximately 99% chance
of getting the decision correct. In contrast, when subjects made the
same decision in the company of six mock participants who were in-
structed to give the wrong answer, 40% followed the mock participants
– a classic case of succumbing to social advice even when this advice-
taking results in an incorrect answer (Asch, 1955). Deutsch and Gerard
shed new light on the original interpretation of this behaviour as (au-
tomatic) public compliance. They experimentally removed the social
pressure from the Asch paradigm, identifying two distinct types of
compliance: that which was mitigated when the social pressure was
removed (normative conformity to social expectations/public com-
pliance), and that which persisted even in the absence of social pressure
(accepting others' views because they are informative/private com-
pliance; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). This suggests that advice-taking may
be motivated both by a public willingness to conform to social rules and
by private convictions. This view has been supported by psychological
experiments (Freedman & Fraser, 1966; Sowden et al., 2018) and, more
recently, also by computational simulations (Constant, Ramstead,
Veissière, & Friston, 2019; Toelch & Dolan, 2015).
These studies suggest that the decision processes underpinning
public and private compliance can be distinguished using experimental
techniques, and that advice-taking often consists of combining these
two types of belief change. This distinction is supported by studies that
have investigated the neural basis of public versus private compliance.
For example, Izuma and Adolphs (2013) asked students to update
value-based decisions based on the advice of a liked or disliked group,
and tested whether the updated preferences still persisted four months
later. Strikingly, the researchers found that, when activity in the dor-
somedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) was low, the subjects showed
public compliance that did not lead to a persistent shift in preferences.
In contrast, when dmPFC activation was high, the shift in preference
was persistent — representing a neural signature of private belief
change. A similar dmPFC region has also been shown to take into ac-
count the reliability of other's views about everyday products in the
form of Amazon star ratings (De Martino et al., 2017) and is involved in
observational learning, where it tracks the actions of others (Burke
et al., 2010). Together these studies suggest a role of the dmPFC in
using or weighing others' advice in a way that is informed by its re-
liability (Behrens et al., 2008; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010;
Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2017), which may be more relevant to
informational (private) motivations than to social (public) motivations.
8. Neuro-computational insights into using or weighing
What is meant by the ability to “use or weigh” in the context of
DMC? The contentious status of use or weigh in cases in which capacity
is in dispute suggests that a perspective from decision neuroscience may
shed light on the kinds of processes that support the ability to use or
weigh decision evidence as per the MCA requirement. In the current
article we have argued that advice-taking provides a “model system” for
understanding the use and weigh requirement, given that how in-
dividuals respond to (formal, informal or hypothetical) advice is often
at the heart of both capacity assessments and capacity disputes.
In this last section we consider how insights from decision neu-
roscience can be generalised to more complex, real-world decision
problems. Most studies of advice-taking have used simple PDM tasks in
which there is an objectively correct answer (such as the random-dot
motion task). It remains to be seen how post-decision processing and
advice-taking operate in tasks such as the food choice task introduced
earlier as a canonical example of VDM. More broadly, there is a sub-
stantial challenge in translating insights from laboratory decision-
making paradigms into the emotionally-charged, often one-off decisions
faced by individuals subject to capacity assessments. However, studies
of moral decision-making suggest that similar domain-general
Fig. 4. A schematic illustration of private and public
compliance. (a). An example of private compliance,
in which the use or weigh process consists of enga-
ging with new evidence (e.g. the reliability of the
advice) leading to a shift in private beliefs. (b). An
example of public compliance, where advice leads to
public statements of agreement without a shift in
privately held beliefs. The resulting decision out-
come is similar in panels (a) and (b), i.e. in agree-
ment with the advice, but has different consequences
for behaviour.
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evidence-accumulation frameworks also hold for even the most serious
choice problems (Shenhav & Greene, 2014). For instance, the classic
trolley dilemma asks how people trade-off the motivations to save cer-
tain lives at the cost to others' (Fischer & Ravizza, 1992; Foot, 1967;
Thomson, 1985). People with higher dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(dlPFC) activity are more outcome-based, in that they are more likely to
consider killing one to save five morally justifiable (Greene, Nystrom,
Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley,
& Cohen, 2001), possibly because the dlPFC is involved in suppressing
automatic emotional responses in complex social situations (Sanfey,
Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2013). Importantly however,
when the dilemmas have actual consequences or when the act of killing
is made more salient, people who first approve of the more outcome-
based decision often change their preferences (Gold, Pulford, & Colman,
2015; Thomson, 1985), suggesting an important role of emotions in
changes of mind about moral issues (for a possible computational basis,
see: Crockett, 2013). Indeed, some aspects of the advice-taking process
– such as metacognition and mentalising – may provide an enabling
context that supports the ability to use or weigh decision evidence
about a range of decision problems. We focus here on three aspects of
metacognition that exemplify this point:
1) Metacognition is a broadly domain-general resource – having good
metacognition on one task predicts having good metacognition on
another, unrelated task (McCurdy et al., 2013; Song et al., 2011;
Mazaniceux, Fleming, Souchay, & Moulin, 2018), and this domain-
generality may be supported by abstract representations of self-
performance in anterior prefrontal cortex (Morales, Lau, & Fleming,
2018; Rouault, Mcwilliams, Allen, & Fleming, 2018). Understanding
how metacognition operates in laboratory situations may therefore
inform how metacognition (and its failures) affect advice-taking in
real-world contexts.
2) Metacognitive sensitivity is not necessarily associated with greater
intelligence or intellectual ability. In a recent study, we collected
data from almost 1000 individuals in a general population sample,
quantifying both their metacognitive awareness of making good or
bad perceptual choices, and a proxy for IQ (Rouault, Seow, et al.,
2018). While there was a strong link between IQ and the speed/
accuracy of the initial decision, there was no relationship between
IQ and people's ability to evaluate their decision-making. Meta-
cognitive sensitivity may therefore track an individual's awareness
of their decision process independently of whether it is determined
by a particular set of values or intellectual style.
3) People have awareness of the consistency or accuracy of even value-
based, subjective choices. In other words, people have a sense of
when they are making a good choice, and this self-knowledge may
share a similar neural basis to metacognition about other types of
decision (De Martino et al., 2013). In turn, people with greater
metacognitive sensitivity about value-based choices tend to make
more consistent decisions over time (Folke, Jacobsen, Fleming, & De
Martino, 2016). This self-knowledge about our preferences may be
akin to a “higher-order desire” that endorses our first-order motives
– we “want to want” something. Frankfurt (1971) identifies the
presence of such second-order desires with autonomy, and empirical
work on metacognition about VDM may inform an emerging un-
derstanding of autonomy and agency in DMC. This perspective holds
promise for integrating work on metacognition of decision-making
(as indexing second-order desires) and notions of free will and au-
tonomy that are important in relation to decision-making capacity
(Zürcher, Elger, & Trachsel, 2019). Indeed, it seems that practi-
tioners “on the ground” often inform their assessment of whether a
patient is using or weighing decision-evidence according to whether
an individual has insight into the relevant evidence supporting a
particular choice, and can reflect on the consequences of their ac-
tions (Owen, Freyenhagen, Hotopf, & Martin, 2015).
More broadly, the interplay between metacognition, mentalising
and advice-taking processes may provide a useful conceptual frame-
work for thinking about apparent “failures” of DMC. For instance, one
could usefully ask whether the lack of capacity of Z in the opening
example is due to a problem with mentalising, metacognition about her
own preferences, or with the processes involved in incorporating social
influence with her own beliefs (either privately or publicly). Knowledge
of this sort could be used to provide targeted support, e.g. by providing
metacognitive training (Carpenter et al., 2019) or by seeking to reduce
or remove social pressures. For instance, Owen, Freyenhagen,
Richardson, and Hotopf (2009) note that in the case of delusions, pa-
tients' metacognition may be intact, in that deluded beliefs and beha-
viours may be entirely self-consistent. However, mentalising may be
less so, in the sense that delusions by definition do not map onto a
shared, social reality. A finer-grained conceptualisation of the neuro-
computational processes supporting advice-taking will, we hope, pro-
vide a framework for discussing such cases.
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